SECURITY BY ARCHITECTURE

Control is built into every signature.

A device share and a platform share act together. Policies, approvals and verifiable evidence govern every movement of value.

2-of-2 MPC

Two shares. One authorised signature.

Two shares. One authorised signature.The private key is generated in shares and is never assembled. Both participants must sign; the coordinator cannot see either share. Customer device: Secure Enclave / StrongBox. Platform share: HSM / KMS envelope encryption. Policy engine. Untrusted coordinator. EVM · Bitcoin · Solana · Tron. Bank data centre Customer device Secure Enclave / StrongBox Biometric approval · device share Policy engine Limits · allowlists · maker-checker Platform share HSM / KMS envelope encryption Untrusted coordinator Cannot see shares · routes messages 2-of-2 MPC signing Chain gateway EVM · Bitcoin · Solana · Tron
The private key is generated in shares and is never assembled. Both participants must sign; the coordinator cannot see either share.

Recovery stays under customer control.

Distributed key generation creates separate shares; proactive refresh renews them without changing the public address. Customer-controlled recovery uses two escrow holders, an approval quorum and a waiting period. Recovery authority is separate from routine signing, and recovery exercises are part of deployment acceptance.

Evidence that follows every decision.

The policy engine enforces whitelists, limits and maker-checker approvals. Seven user roles and four service roles separate responsibilities. A kill switch can halt operations. Hash-chained records and a WORM evidence archive preserve the decision trail; operational secrets stay in a dedicated vault.

Standards, protocols and control mappings.

Protocol references and control mappings. These are not product certifications.

Standards, protocols and control mappings.
Regulatory frameworkFortiva control mappingEvidence status
NIST IR 8214Threshold cryptography architecture alignment.Control mapping
DKLS23Threshold ECDSA for secp256k1 chains.Protocol reference
FROST · RFC 9591Threshold signing for Ed25519 chains.Protocol reference
FIPS 140-3 HSMHardware protection reference for the bank-selected HSM. Validation depends on the deployed hardware and configuration.Hardware-dependent validation
CCSSKey lifecycle, access separation and recovery control mapping.Control mapping
ISO/IEC 27001Access control, logging and operational security controls mapping.Control mapping
TÜBİTAKInformation-systems criteria mapped to deployment controls and evidence.Control mapping
Independent security auditSeven-phase independent security audit completed.Completed security audit
Independent cryptography auditIncluded in every deployment scope.Deployment-scoped cryptography audit

CONTROL AT EVERY LAYER

Security you can evaluate.

A seven-phase independent security audit has been completed. An independent cryptography audit is part of every deployment scope. Signed images, an SBOM and reproducible build inputs let the bank verify what it runs. Request the evidence pack under NDA.

~440klines of Go
4,181automated tests
175API endpoints
64event types
46CI jobs
46operations runbooks
Request the evidence pack

FORTIVA

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